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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
Department Editor: Joseph F. Grinnell*
RE-ORDERING THE NATIONAL AIR MAP - HOW CAN IT BE
ACCOMPLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT?O NE of the major problems that has been presented to the CAB for
solution is the pressing need for the formulation of a policy which will
permit and encourage the revision of our air pattern in light of the
advances that have been made and will continue to be made in equipment
and flying techniques.' The major part of this paper will be devoted to
a discussion of the various methods that have been suggested to attain
this objective and to the presentation of an analysis of their respective
merits as viewed in the light of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.2
When the Act was passed in 1938, the United States embarked on a.
new era insofar as the development of aviation was concerned. This Act
had for its objective not the mere regulation of air transportation, but
rather the active promotion, fostering and encouragement of aviation and
the development of an over-all air pattern "properly adapted to the present
and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense." 3 The Board's
control over the air map was derived from Section 401 which provided
that "no air carrier shall engage in any air transportation unless there
is in force a certificate issued by the Board authorizing such air carrier
to engage in such transportation. '4 The Board was not to issue the cer-
tificate of convenience and necessity unless it found that the certification
of the applicant would be in the public interest as determined by the ob-
jectives of the Act.5
* Journal Editor, Northwestern University Legal Publications Board.
1 See Western-United, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 8 CAB 298, p. 343.
252 Stat. 973, 49 USCA § 401 (Supp. 1947).
3 The declaration of the policy of the Act appears in §2, providing:
"(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system
properly adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic
commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
"(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize
and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in
and foster sound economic conditions in such transportation, and to improve the
relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
"(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air car-
riers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or
advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
"(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of
an air transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and
domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national
defense;
"(e) .The regulation of air commerce in such manner as to best promote its
development and safety; and
"(f) The encouragement and development of civil aeronautics." 52 Stat.
980, 49 USCA §402 (Supp. 1947).
4 52 Stat. 987, 49 USCA §481 (Supp. 1947).
5 §401 (d) (1) provides:
"The Board shall issue a certificate authorizing the whole or any part of the
transportation covered by the application, if it finds that the applicant is fit, will-
ing, and able to perform such transportation properly, and to conform to the proj
visions of this Act and the rules, regulations, and requirements of the Board
hereunder, and that such transportation is required by the public convenience and
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The fact that the air network could be changed just as drastically by
mergers and consolidations of previously certified carriers was recognized
by the drafters of the statute and these activities were to be approved by
the Board only if they met the same standard required for original cer-
tification.6 However, by allowance, ' subject to Board approval of merger
of air carriers, an additional problem was placed before the Board, viz.,
that of determining whether the price set on the transaction by the parties
involved was in the public interest.7 This in turn involved the question
of whether the CAB should allow capitalization of the certificate of con-
venience and necessity for the purposes of sale.8 The earliest case in which
the Board was squarely confronted with that issue was the First Marquette
case.9 The purchase price set by the parties was largely in excess of the
physical assets, and developmental costs, and it was evident there had been
a capitalization of the certificate of convenience and necessity in its de-
termination.' 0 The Board held that a price above the prudent investment
value of the property of the carrier being sold would not be in the public
interest as they opined that it was inevitable that that part of the price
represented by the certificate of convenience and necessity would even-
tually be paid for by the public."
Shortly thereafter, in the Second Marquette case,' where approxi-
mately the same transaction was involved,13 the Board made a complete
about face. This time franchise value as an element in the purchase
price was approved as being within the public interest. 14 The Board
reaffirmed this holding in the Western-United case, 15 in which Mr. Landis
filed a long dissenting opinion. This line of decisions is of prime impor-
tance not only because of the effect it has on the financial structures of
the air carriers, but also, and what this writer believes is more important,
because it is interrelated with the need for a rejuvenation of our national
air map. The members of the Board, although differing as to the means,
are unanimous in the belief that it is in the public interest to have
a reordering of our air pattern.'6
The Board does not have any specific statutory power to compel an
aircarrier against its will, to transfer its certificate to another, even
necessity; otherwise such application shall be denied." 52 Stat. 987, 49 USCA
§481 (Supp. 1947).
For the factors that enter into a determination of public interest, see note 3
8upra.6§408(c) provides in part that:
"Unless ... the Board finds that the consolidation, (or) merger .. .will not
be consistent with the public interest ... it shall by order approve such consolida-
tion (or) merger. .. ." 52 Stat. 1001, 49 USCA §488 (Supp. 1947).
7 Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, 2 CAB 1, 10 (1940).
8 Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, 2 CAB 1 (1940) ; Acquisition of Mar-
quette -by TWA, Supplemental Opinion, 2 CAB 409 (1940) ; Western-United, note
1 supra.
The primary problem as to whether the merger itself, exclusive of the matter
of price, is within the public interest, and the factors involved in the Board's deci-
sions, is definitively discussed in Westwood, Choice of the Air Carrier for New
Air Transport Routes, Part 1, 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1947).
9 Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, 2 CAB 1 (1940).
10 Physical assets were valued at about $30,000 as compared with the pur-
chase price of $473,333.
11 Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, 2 CAB 1, 15 (1940).
12 Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, Supplemental Opinion, '2 CAB 409
(1940).
13 The parties had submitted an amended agreement so that the purchase
price was reduced by $160,000.
14 Id. at 415.
15 Western-United, note 1 supra.
16 Id. at 323; see also p. 343.
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though such a transfer might be in the public interest.1 7 Still, this does
not mean that the Board is powerless to modernize our air network. There
have been three devices which have been suggested to accomplish this end :18
(1) The Board could issue new certificates over the same or parallel
routes where public interest requires this, even though such new
operations may divert substantial revenues from existing carriers.19
If the competition is made severe enough, the resulting economic
pressure will force the originally certified carrier to withdraw.
(2) The Board could consider the refusal of an uneconomic carrier
to accept what is in the Board's estimation the reasonable value of
its physical assets as sufficient to support a charge of inefficient man-
agement, thereby resulting in a reduction of subsidy to the recalci-
trant "seller," and pressurizing the carrier into a forced sale.20
(3) The Board could let the profit motive supply the incentive
necessary to induce the seller to relinquish his route by allowing a
capitalization of the certificate of convenience and necessity.21
Method No. 1-Granting Competition
(a) Mechanics-The Board first makes a determination that it is in
the public interest for Carrier B to operate a route which Carrier A had
previously been certificated to run. Carrier B then makes an offer to
Carrier A to purchase the route for a price based on what the Board con-
siders to be the fair market value of its physical assets. If Carrier A
refuses, the Board then issues another certificate to fly the same route
or a closely paralleling route to Carrier B. The result is that Carrier B
is able to operate more efficiently since the route is, ex hypothesi, an
integrated part of B's system, and Carrier A is squeezed out of business.
(b) Criticism-This method does not specifically contravert the terms
of the statute -but it leaves little else unturned in a major upheaval of
the Board's policy to date re competition. The Board has been committed
to a policy that it will not install competition on a route unless it is their
opinion that the route can economically support two carriers.
"The Act thus implies the desirability of competition in the air
transportation industry when such competition will be neither destruc-
tive nor uneconomical .. . 22 (Italics supplied.)
This suggested device is a complete reversal of that theory as it is a means
of changing the air map only by very reason of the fact that competition
is economically unsound on this particular route. In addition to overruling
this well established body of administrative decisions, it seems to be
founded on a misconstruction of the statute, as viewed in the light of
surrounding circumstances.
17 A forced transfer of a certificate has the same effect as a revocation and
reissuance of a certificate. §401 (g) provides that the certificate shall continue
into effect until revoked. §401 (h) provides that the certificate may only be re-
voked for an intentional violation of the statute. 52 Stat. 989, 49 USCA §481
(Supp. 1947). The carrier involved in our situation ex hypothesi is not guilty of
a willful violation of the statute.
Is There is a possible fourth method in that the Board has the power to sus-
pend a certificate if they find that public convenience and necessity so require. 52
Stat. 989, 49 USCA §481 (Supp. 1947).
But it is felt that there is a big distinction between suspension and revoca-
tion. See discussion by Black, Suspension of Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity Under the C. A. A. of 1938, 14 J. of Air L. & C. 512 (1947).19 National Air, Daytona Beach--Jacksonville Op., 1 CAA 612, 617 (1940).
20 Western-United, supra note 1, at 342.
21 Id. at 30 (majority opinion).
22 TWA, North-South California Service, 4 CAB 373, 375 (1943).
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This method is based on Section 2, where it appears that public con-
venience and necessity should be deemed, among other things, to require:
"Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound develop-
ment of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of
the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal
Service, and of the national defense." 23
A proper interpretation of this provision entails a search for the reasons
for its inclusion in the Act. That the "point to point competition" neces-
sarily employed in this suggested device was not in the minds of the
framers of the statute is evidenced by the Report of the Federal Aviation
Commission of 1935 upon which they drew freely for ideas.24 The framers
of the statute seemed to include this mild reference to competition only
as a soothing antidote to the prevalent fears of monopoly,25 and to invoke
an interpretation of this provision as is suggested above would be no more
than a rationalization of a desired conclusion. That the Board does not
take this method too seriously is evidenced by the fact that it is not
even dignified by discussion in any of the Board's decisions, even where,
as in the Western-United case, it had been proposed as a possible solution
for the air map in the brief of the Public Counsel. 26 Even the effective-
ness of this method is not beyond reproach unless it be coupled with the
elimination of subsidy payments to the first carrier. If that is a part of
this device, then it becomes closely akin to method No. 2.
Method No. 2-Reduction of Mail Pay to Recalcitrant Seller
(a) Mechanics-Assume again that Carrier A is an uneconomic carrier
which has been operating a route which the Board feels would form a more
closely integrated part of Carrier B's system. If Carrier B made an offer to
buy out Carrier A at a price which the Board considered fair in that it was
"bottomed on investment," 27 and Carrier A refused to accept, the Board
would reduce its subsidy on a charge that it was not being.managed economi-
cally. 28 Thus Carrier A would be pressurized into an involuntary merger
and transfer of its certificate by action of the Board.
(b) Criticism-A forced transfer is in practical effect a revocation of
A's certificate and as such, it seems more pertinent to look for guidance to
that part of the Act that directly deals with revocation of certificates rather
than the section that has to do with the setting of mail rates. We find under
Section 401 (h) that the only ground existent for withdrawal of the certifi-
cate is a violation of the Act, itself, or of some provision of the certificate.2 9
That this is the only ground contained in the Act is a vigorous denial of the
existence of the means suggested by Mr. Landis.
23 52 Stat. 980, 49 USCA §402 (Supp. 1947).
24 Report indicates that there was little direct competition and that the type
of competition that was thought desirable was of an indirect source. REPORT OF
FEDERAL AVIATION COMMISSION, 61, 62 (January 1935).
25 "Furthermore, there was undoubtedly a mild nervousness about the dan-
gers of 'monopoly' when the Act was under consideration." Westwood, Choice of
the Air Carrier for New Air Transport Routes, Part H, 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
159, 166 (1948).
26 Western-United, note 1 supra.
27 Landis applies the sole standard of investment value in a determination of
fair price in much the same manner as he would employ that sole standard in
rate-setting. Western-United, supra note 1, at 342.
28 §406 (b) provides for the determination of the mail rates, which is the indi-
rect method of subsidization employed by this Act. It sets out as one of the fac-
tors to be considered a judgment of whether the carrier has been under honest,
economical and efficient management.
29 See note 17 supra.
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It is submitted that what the legislators had in mind when they talked
about economic, efficient and honest management was the internal operation
of the air carrier. They wanted the Board to give due consideration to
unnecessarily high operating costs so that rates would be set so as to squeeze
out this avoidable waste. The situation before us now is of a different sort.
The lack of economy involved is what may be called "external uneconomy" in
that it is not the result of waste within the organization of the carrier, but
rather is a result of technological developments which render this route
uneconomical for this carrier to operate, regardless of its internal efficiency.
To penalize a carrier in this way seems not only a violation of the intent of
the statute but a violation of due process as well. It is true that the govern-
ment gave the carrier the certificate but this is not the place for the applica-
tion of "What the Lord giveth, the Lord may take away." By the words of
the Act, the taking away of the certificate was to be only for violation of the
terms of the statute or of some provision of the certificate.30 That was not
the case here.
The question then arises as to how effective a cure this is for the air
map. There is a serious restriction to its applicability in that by confession
of its proponent, it can only take effect in the case of an uneconomic route.3 1
Thus, if the route is a profitable one, the Board will be powerless to act al-
though it finds that it will be in the public interest to make the line a part of
another system.32
The dangers involved to the public in the employment of this device are a
sufficient deterrent even if the statute itself does not prove enough of an
obstacle. Mr. Landis, himself, realized that one of the by-products of a car-
rier's receiving an inadequate return on its investment would be a deteriora-
tion in the quality of the service. This is a more serious result than a mere
inconvenience to the public.
"Impairment in the quality of service may seriously undermine
safety standards ...Maintenance procedures would be compromised;
desirable but avoidable expenditures would be foregone; the number of
employees would be kept at a minimum. All of these developments mean
a series of compromises between maintaining fully adequate service and
higher than minimum safety requirements on the one hand, and provid-
ing barely adequate service and minimum safety standards on the
other." 33
Thus while the carrier was being squeezed into submission, the public might
pay for this conflict in human lives. The longer the carrier lasted in its
fight for survivorship, the greater the danger to the public. That might
well prove a platform for an argument that the subsidy not be reduced but
eliminated. But even Mr. Landis does not find support for that in the stat-
ute84 --and still a euthanasia might prove to be more in the public interest
than a slow strangulation of the carrier.
Method No. 3-Capitalization of Franchise Value
This method, which is the one which has been adopted by the Board,3 5
employs as an instrument for modernizing the air map, the profit incentive.
It permits Carrier A to sell out to Carrier B at a price greater than the mere
30 See note 17 supra.
31 See Western-United, supra note 1, at 342.
32 It is true, but to a lesser extent, that the same limitation might apply to
method No. 3 as the price set on a profitable route might well be prohibitive.
33 See Western-United, supra note 1, at 339, 340 ft. note 23.
34 Id. at 342.
35 Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, Supplemental Opinion, 2 CAB 409
(1940) ; Western-United, note 1 supra.
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value of its investment, allowing the seller to capitalize its certificate of con-
venience and necessity. In so doing it employs the profit motive of free
enterprise to break the stalemate and to effect a truly voluntary change of
the air map.88
in an effort to keep that part of the price which can only be attributable
to the certificate from being borne by the public, the Board provided that
that portion of the purchase price shall come out of surplus and be written
off immediately. 7 The Board also stated in definite terms that it has been
and would continue to be its policy not to figure it in as a part of the rate
base either directly or indirectly.38 It is at that point that Mr. Landis takes
issue with the Board. He contends that it is inevitable that despite the pre-
ventative measures taken by the Board, that part of the price which is rep-
resented by a capitalization of the certificate will sneak into the rate base
and thus in the final analysis, be borne by the public. 9 A judgment as to
whether this expenditure will necessarily find its way into the rates as set
by the Board depends on an analysis of the method by which the rates are
set, and an appreciation of the philosophy and theory behind it. This is the
basic cause of the Board's schism.
Mr. Landis' belief that this capitalization of the certificate is bound to
result in inflation stems from a basic premise that a utility is only entitled
to the mathematical equivalent of a fair return on its investment. Invest-
ments are figured at their original cost to the carrier less depreciation; and
fair return is that precise profit that is necessary to attract fresh capital
into the industry; that anything over and above that figure is something
that the carrier should not receive-but only does because of the inefficiency
of the Board in setting rates. 40 The majority, on the other hand, looks at a
fair return on an investment base as a constitutional minimum, but by no
means as a maximum.41 It does not consider the fact that different carriers
receive different rates of return on their respective investments as a failing
on their part. In fact it has been the result of a conscious effort on the part
of the Board and the result of a definite policy to reward a carrier for mak-
ing headway in the economy of its operation by virtue of efficient manage-
ment. 42 The ultimate goal has been, of course, to reach that point where the
carriers are able to operate without the benefit of a subsidy.
36 Peculiarly enough, Mr. Landis admits that the reordering of the air map
can only be accomplished by voluntary consolidations, mergers, and route trans-
fers. See Western-United, supra note 1, at 325. It is scarcely tenable that the
method suggested by Mr. Landis is voluntary.
37 Western-United, supra note 1, at 342, 343.
But there have been occasions where it was impossible or inadvisable to
charge to surplus that part of the purchase price which represents the capitaliza-
tion of the franchise. In that case, the Board will substitute a requirement that
it be charged to special account No. 1920, under the Uniform System of Accountsfor Domestic Air Carriers. Board Order Serial E-786, Sept. 10, 1947.
38 Western-United, supra note 1, at 314.
39 Id. at 338.
40 Id. at 326.
41 Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out in his notable dissent in the Southwestern
Bell Telephone Company case that while a constitutionally compensatory rate re-
quires that the public utility be allowed to earn enough to attract capital, a fair
and reasonable rate fixed by a regulatory body "may allow an efficiently managed
utility much more." Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 262 U.S. 276, 291 (1923). See excellent discussion by Burt and Highsaw,
Regulation of Rates in Air Transportation, Part II, 7 La. L. Rev. 378, 382 (1947).
42 "Between the barely compensatory rate required by the Constitution and
the fair and reasonable rate contemplated by a legislation enactment there exists
a marginal field in which administrative discretion may operate to provide an
incentive to enterprising management and a stimulus to pioneering initiative
which are so essential to the development of air carrier industry." American Air
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It seems evident that if the rate of return can be no greater than a fair
return on investment, that part of the purchase price which was excluded
from the rate base will ultimately have to be included in it; 43 it is equally
true, however, that if the purchasing carrier due to his efficiency, has been
getting more than a reasonable return, if figured on the investment base
alone, there is no reason to state a priori that either the rate will be raised
or the investment base expanded.
44
If the problem of rate-setting were to be met de novo, there would be an
argument for holding that the constitutional minimum should be the maxi-
mum. But the Board has seen fit to use the investment base as a starting
point and has gone on to make upward adjustments from there, using the
attainment of the objectives of the Act as a guide.45 This policy seems to be
gaining in favor as evidenced by a trend in setting joint rates.46 Thus Mr.
Landis' complaint seems in the main to be lodged against the method of
rate-setting employed by the Board rather than against the capitalization of
the franchise per se. 47
The Board, as a condition to its approval to the purchase in the Western-
United case, required the purchaser to charge to earned surplus and to write
off immediately that part of the purchase price that was not allowed as a
part of the rate base. It seemed to feel that this would prevent this figure
from creeping into the rate base. 4s But it is suggested that this will have
little effect one way or the other insofar as keeping the investment base at
the same size is concerned, 49 except for obvious and intentional inclusions
which is not the nub of our present problem. This accounting practice has
another effect, however, which Mr. Landis tends to minimize.50 It is of
Lines, Inc.-Mail Rate Proceeding, 3 CAB 323, 334 (1942); accord, Eastern Air
Lines, Inc.-Mail Rate Proceeding, 3 CAB 733, 755 (1942).
43 Assume that 6% is the rate needed to attract capital in the industry. If
Carrier A has a rate base of $4,000,000, the return on the investment would be
$240,000. If then Carrier A buys out, at a price of $3,000,000, Carrier B whose
investments were valued at $1,000,000, the new rate base would be but $5,000,000,
while the actual investment of Carrier A is $7,000,000. This would yield Carrier
A a return of only $300,000 on a $7,000,000 investment or approximately 4%. By
hypothesis, this would be insufficient to attract new money to the carrier and the
Board would seem compelled either to increase the rate of return in the author-
ized investment or to allow the entry of the additional $2,000,000 into the rate
base.
44 If we take the actual rate-setting policy of the Board into consideration,
the result reached in note 43 supra does not necessarily follow. We can imagine a
situation in which Carrier A was getting a return of 9% due to efficiency of oper-
ation. That would yield $450,000 on the combined rate base or better than 6% on
the amount actually invested. That would be sufficient ex hypothesi to attract
new capital to Carrier A.
45 See note 39 supra.
46 Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Mail Rates. 6 CAB 551, 555 (1945). The use of
uniform rates accentuates the differences in rates of return of the various car-
riers, as with the spread of investment bases amongst the grouped carriers, less
emphasis has to be put on the investment base if uniform rates are to be charged
to the public.
47 It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into a detailed appraisal of the
rate-setting methods of the Board. See Burt and Highsaw, Regulations of Rates
in Air Transportation, Part I, 7 La. L. Rev. 1 (1946); Vanneman, Recent Trends
in Domestic Airmail Rate Cases, 14 J. of Air L. & C. 254 (1947).
48 Western-United, supra note 1, at 319.
49 Id. at 336.
50 The argument is presented that even if the purchasing air carrier is in
good financial status at the time of the proposed merger, the field of air transpor-
tation is subject to such grave fluctuations that not much weight can be put on it.
Id. at 312. This type of argument would tend toward the imposition of a restric-
tion on the payment of dividends out of surplus. It can hardly be argued that
this would be within the power of the Board.
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value in that a large earned surplus is some indication of the financial health
of a corporation. It also acts as a brake on a further change in the capital
structure of the carrier over which the Board has no immediate control, viz.,
by cutting down the fund available for dividends.
Mr. Landis objects that if the purchase price is not bottomed on invest-
ment, there is no way of determining whether the price is in the public
interest.51 If he means that there is no rule of thumb that can be applied,
the writer agrees. But merely because an objective is difficult to obtain is
no reason to abandon it. It is admitted that the Board in the Western-
United case did not discuss at any length the factors that go into a determi-
nation of whether the price is in the public interest. It did draw certain
rough lines. As a general guide, it set the fair commercial price as that
established by the arm's length bargaining of the parties. 52 As an outside
limit, it stated that the price cannot be disproportionately large.5 3 The
financial competence of the buyer was also taken into consideration. 54 The
Board, in addition, stated that it will only interfere if managerial discretion
has been abused. 55 In the Second Marquette case, the Board treated the
purchase as but one element of the public interest,56 stating that it was to be
balanced with other pertinent factors.57 The following are some of the ele-
ments which it is suggested should be weighed in a determination of the rea-
sonability of the capitalization of the franchise:
(1) The overall advantage of the transaction to the air map.
(2) The prognosis as to whether under the present rate system the
buyer will recoup the "excessive" part of the purchase price within
a reasonable time.
(3) The saving to the public in the subsidy to the air carrier being
bought out.58
(4) The degree to which the transaction will strengthen the purchasing
carrier.
It seems to be more in keeping with the theory of the Act to apply to the
purchase price itself not a mechanical standard but many of the same fac-
tors which initially went into a determination of whether it was in the pub-
lic interest to have this merger at all. In fact an inconsistency would arise
if public interest is determined one way in regard to the physical merger it-
self and another way in regard to the purchase price. And indeed the stat-
ute makes no such differentiation. 59
Even assuming there is an inflationary aspect to these transactions, if
the air map be skillfully planned with an eye to the future, this reshuffling
5' Id. at 318.
52 "In appraising the reasonableness of the purchase price as related to the
public interest in the transaction now before us, one guide to judgment is the fair
commercial price as established by the arm's length bargaining of the parties."
Western-United, supra note 1, at 314.
53 Western-United, supra note 1, at 315.
54 Id. at 317.
55 Id. at 318.
56 Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, Supplemental Opinion, 2 CAB 409, 415
(1940). Cf. Western-United, supra note 1, at 314 (where the Board seems to say
that the sole criterion is the judgment of .the parties).
57 52 Stat. 980, 49 USCA §402 (Supp. 1947).
5s If the carrier selling the route is a "need" carrier and remains in the
industry, there is no reason why the profit made on this transaction would not be
a proper charge against its subsidy. See Western-United, supra note 1, at 328.
59 There is only one definition of public interest in the statute. 52 Stat. '980,
49 USCA §402 (Supp. 1947).
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of air routes should be able to be kept to a minimum, and it is possible that
the Board is allowing the sad experience of the railroad industry to warp its
judgment in this matter.60
It is felt that none of the methods discussed offer a perfect solution to
the problem. It behooves the Board to choose a device which will be effec-
tive in dealing with the problem and still not be violative of the statute. It
is all too easy to forget that essentially the matter before the Board is one
of statutory construction and it is subinitted that the method chosen by the
Board is the only one suggested that lies within a proper interpretation of
the present statute.61
ALAN F. WOHLSTETTER *
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ORDERS OF CAB WHICH REQUIRE
APPROVAL BY THE PRESIDENT
In December 1940, the Waterman Steamship Corporation' applied to
the Civil Aeronautics Board for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity under Section 4012 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,3 in order
to operate an air route to Puerto Rico. This application was subsequently
consolidated with other applications, 4 and copies of all were submitted to
the President as required by Section 801 of the Act.' After hearings on
these applications, the CAB submitted its opinion and proposed orders to
the President. The President disapproved of portions of the proposed
orders, and indicated the changes he required.6 These changes were incor-
porated in a revised order of the Board which the President approved.
Waterman requested a rehearing of this order which had denied its applica-
tion for a certificate. This request was denied, 7 and Waterman appealed to
60 See Union Bus Lines, Inc.-Purchase--Joe Amberson, 5 MCC 201, 204
(1937).61 "Yet it does not necessarily follow that from the standpoint of the over-all
public interest it might not be more advantageous to the Nation to bear a greater
burden in mail pay in order to achieve benefits in air transportation not obtain-
able otherwise." See American Air Lines, Control of Mid-Continent Air Lines, 7
CAB 365, 383 (1946).
* Student, Third Year, Harvard Law School. The author expresses his grati-
tude to Prof. George P. Baker of the Harvard Business School for his indoctrina-
tion into the problems of the air transportation industry.
1 The original applicant was Waterman Airlines, Inc., a subsidiary of the
present respondent.
2 "No air carrier shall engage in any air transportation unless there is in
force a certificate issued by the Board . . ." 52 Stat. 987 (1938), 49 USCA §481
(Supp. 1946).
3 52 Stat. 973 (1938), 49 USCA §401 et seq. (Supp. 1946).
4 The consolidated record was known as Additional Service to Latin America,
6 CAB 857 (1946).
5 "The issuance, denial, transfer, amendment, cancellation, suspension, or
revocation of, and the terms, conditions, and limitations contained in, any certifi-
cate authorizing an air carrier to engage in overseas or foreign air transporta-
tion, or air transportation between places in the same Territory or possession, or
any permit issuable to any foreign air carrier under section 402, shall be subject
to the approval of the President. Copies of all applications in respect of such
certificates and permits shall be transmitted to the President by the Board before
hearing thereon, and all decisions thereon by the Board shall be. submitted to the
President before publication thereof . . ." 52 Stat. 1014 (1938), 49 USCA §601
(Supp. 1946).
6 The changes made by the President did not touch upon Waterman's applica-
tion. 6 CAB 857 (1946). See note 32 infra.
7 CAB Order 4795, May 17, 1946.
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the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit under Section 1006 (a) of the Act.8
The Circuit Court held that review was proper, 9 but the Supreme Court
granted certiorari,' 0 and reversed the decision of the Circuit Court.11
The case thus presented the court with the question of whether an
American-flag carrier, having been denied an application to operate from
this country into a foreign nation 12 could obtain judicial review of this
denial. Although the literal language of the statute appears plainly to
confer this right,' 3 the court held that there could be, no review. Looking
to Section 1006 (a) alone, the majority14 conceded that a literal reading
would indicate review was permissible under the Act.15 Section 801, how-
ever, with the requirement that the President act on negative, as well as
affirmative orders of the Board, 16 forced the Court to the conclusion that
the President's power was more than a mere ability to thwart affirmative
action by the Board. 17 If the President's power was intended to be only a
right of veto, why must he act on orders of the Board which do not authorize
any positive action by a carrier? Having concluded that the President had
a detailed and affirmative power under Section 801, the court felt compelled
to hold that where his approval was required, it was his action, not that
of, the Board, which transformed the administrative process into a final
and binding order. The deliberations by the Board in such a case were
8 "Any order, affirmative or negative, issued by the Board under this Act, ex-
cept any order in respect of any foreign air carrier subject to the approval of the
President as provided in section 801 of this Act, shall be subject to review by the
circuit court of appeals of the United States or the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia upon petition, filed within sixty days after the
entry of such order, by any person disclosing a substantial interest in such order.
." 52 Stat. 1024 (1938), 49 USCA §646 (Supp. 1946).
9 Waterman Steamship Corp. v. CAB, 159 F. (2d) 828 (C.C.A. 5th, 1947).
See Note (1947) 14 J. Air L. & C. 524. Contra: Pan-American Airways v. CAB, 121
F. (2d) 810 (C.C.A. 2d, 1941). See Note (1941) 12 Air L. Rev. 406; Note (1947)
Col. L. Rev. 1080.
10 331 U.S. 802 (1947).
11 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
12 By section 1, subsection 2, an air carrier "... means any citizen. of the
United States who undertakes . . . to engage in air transportation." By the same
section, subsection 21, ". .. foreign air transportation . . . means the carriage by
aircraft of persons or property ... between . . . (c) *a place in the United States
and any place outside thereof . . ." 52 Stat. 977 (1938), 49 USCA §401 (Supp.
1946).
13 Section 1006(a). See note 8 supra. Notice that the only exception to the
right of review comes in the case of a foreign air carrier. Section 1, subsection 19
defines a foreign air carrier as ".... any person, not a citizen of the United States,
who undertakes, . . . to engage in foreign air transportation." 52 Stat. 977(1938), 49 USCA §401 (Supp. 1946). There is no question of congressional pur-
pose. The language of section 1006 (a) was specifically amended to read "foreign
air carrier," where it had previously read "foreign air transportation." 83 Cong.
Rec. 6764 (1938).
It is also interesting to note that shortly after the Waterman decision by the
Supreme Court, an amendment to section 1006(a) was offered by Senator McCar-
ran, the effect of which was to make it explicit that orders approved by the Presi-
dent should be subject to judicial review, except orders relating to foreign air
carriers. 94 Cong. Rec. 7166 (1948). The Bill was sent to the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
14 The court split 5 to 4, Mr. Justice Jackson writing for the majority, while
Justices Black, Reed, and Rutledge concurred in the dissent of Mr. Justice Doug-
las. 15 333 U.S. 103, 110 (1948).
16 See note 5 supra.
17,"Nor is the President's control of the ultimate decision a mere right of
veto. It is not alone issuance of such authorizations that are subject to his ap-
proval, but denial, transfer, amendment, cancellation or suspension, as well.
Thus, Presidential control is not limited to a negative, but is a positive and de-
tailed control over the Board's decisions . . ." 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948).
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deemed to be only advisory,18 and not creating any binding rights or obliga-
tions, could not be subject to judicial review.' 0 And after approval by the
President which rendered the order effective, constitutional doctrine pre-
cluded review of the discretionary executive act which vitalized the Board's
decision. 20 Thus to avoid holding Section 1006(a) unconstitutional, the
court felt compelled to construe the language of that section as excluding
review of orders of the Board which have or require approval by the
President.
It may be argued, however, that the Supreme Court should not have
considered itself forced to such lengths in order to avoid the constitutional
objection. It appears possible to avoid this objection and yet give more
complete effect to the language of Section 1006(a) of the Act.21
The language of the Act, and its legislative history permit the inference
that Congress intended only a limited scope to the President's participation.
Throughout the Act there is a differentiation in the treatment of domestic
air carriers operating in this country or to the territories, domestic air
carriers operating to foreign countries, and foreign air carriers operating
within this county.2 2  The President's participation is confined by the
statute to problems which touch upon considerations of foreign affairs,
either by American carriers flying abroad, or aien carriers operating within
18 The court here, and the court in the Pan-American Case, supra note 9, re-
lied heavily on an analogy to the case of United States v. Bush and Co., 310 U.S.
371 (1940), in which judicial review of Presidential proclamations of tariff
changes was denied. The decision was based on the complete executive nature of
the proclamation, made on the basis of recommendations of the Tariff Commission.
Although that decision is undoubtedly correct, the comparison of the cases is ques-
tionable. Whereas under Section 1336 of the Tariff Act the commission "investi-
gates" and "reports" to the President, who "by proclamation" sets the tariff, under
Section 401(d) (1) of the Civil Aeronautics Act, "The Board shall issue a certifi-
cate. if it finds that the applicant is fit, willing, and able, and that such trans-
portation is required by the public convenience and necessity; otherwise such
application shall be denied." 52 Stat. 987 (1938), 49 USCA §481 (Supp. 1946).
The orders made are orders of the Board, acting independently of the executive
office. Section 801, supra note 5, gives the President no more than a power to re-
fuse to approve orders of the Board which he considers inimical to the conduct of
our foreign affairs. See note 17 supra, for the Supreme Court's position on this
point.
19 "But administrative orders are not reviewable unless and until they impose
an obligation, deny a right, or fix some legal relationship as a consummation of
the administrative process." 333 U.S. 103, 112 (1948). See United States v. Los
Angeles and Salt Lake R. Co., 273 U.S. 299 (1927), and Rochester Telephone
Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1938), to the effect that inconclusive admin-
istrative orders, which do not settle the rights and obligations of the parties are
not subject to judicial review.
20 "The dilemma faced by those who demand judicial review of the Board's
order is that, before Presidential approval, it is not a final determination even of
the Board's ultimate action, and after Presidential approval, the whole order, both
in what is approved without change, as well as in amendments which he directs,
derives its vitality from the exercise of unreviewable Presidential discretion."
333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948). See also, United States v. Bush and Co., 310 U.S. 371
(1940) ; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) ; Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
21 See Notes (1947) 14 J. Air L. & C. 524, and (1948) 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1053.
22 The types of air transportation are carefully defined in Section 1. "(21)
'Interstate air transportation,' 'overseas air transportation,' and 'foreign air
transportation,' respectively, mean ... (a) a place in any State of the United
States, or the District of Columbia, and a place in any other State of the United
States or the District of Columbia; or between places in the same State of the
United States through the air space over any place outside thereof; or between
places in the same Territory or possession (except the Philippine Islands) of the
United States, or the District of Columbia; (b) a place in any State of the United
States, or the District of Columbia, and any place in a Territory or possession of
the United States; or between a place in a Territory or possession of the United
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this country.23 Both the statutory language and the, legislative history
indicate unmistakably that the participation of the President was allowed
solely on a consideration of his responsibility for the integrity of our for-
eign affairs. 24 Since this is so, it is logical to suppose that Congress in-
tended his participation to be confined solely to such considerations. 25 Des-
pite the conclusions of the majority of the court,26 the language of Section
801 in requiring the approval of the President, or, by implication, his dis-
approval, does not give the President any more than a power to disapprove
of orders of the Board.
Assuming, for the moment, that such a limited role by the President is
practicable, the Supreme Court's objections to judicial review of presiden-
tially approved orders would seem to be answered. The President's action
would render an affirmative order of the Board effective, but not precluded
from judicial review by reason of a lack of binding effect. 27 By confining
the President's considerations to those of foreign affairs, the final order
becomes' in reality a dual entity. It is a statement by the Board that the
designated carrier is fit, willing and able to fly the route, which the Board
deems to be demanded by the public convenience and necessity. It is a
statement by the President that the operation of the route by an American-
flag carrier has been coordinated with our foreign policy. Allowing the
courts to review a determination by the Board that a particular carrier is,
or is not, qualified to fly a route which is demanded by public convenience
and necessity is not a review of executive discretion and is not contrary to
constitutional principles. 28 The constitutional objection is avoided, and a
rather sweeping disregard of express statutory language is unnecessary.
Since the four dissenting justices found an identifiable portion of the
final order which was clearly the work of the Board and thus was subject
States, and a place in any other Territory or possession of the United States; and
(c) a place in the United States and any place outside thereof .. ." 52 Stat. 977
(1938), 49 USCA §401 (Supp. 1946). A foreign air carrier is a person not a citi-
zen of the United States who seeks to engage in foreign air transportation. See
Section 1, subsection 19, note 13 supra. While a domestic air carrier is required
to obtain a certificate prior to operation, Section 401, supra note 2, by Section 402,
"No foreign air carrier shall engage in foreign air transportation unless there is
in force a permit issued by the Board . . ." 52 Stat. 991 (1938), 49 USCA §482
(Supp. 1946).
23 See Section 801, note 5 supra.
24 See Hearings Before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R.
9738, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938). See note 25 infra.
25 It would seem very strange that Congress would establish an administra-
tive board of experts to make determinations on highly technical matters, and
then give the President, acting without advice as far as these determinations are
concerned an uncontrolled power to require contrary orders from the Board. See
Hearings Before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Bills Relative
to Overseas Air Transportation, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). At page 1260, Mr.
Landis, then Chairman of CAB, said, "My feeling is that certainly you want an
overriding power of the President to supervise the actions of the CAB in this
field, because there may be very broad considerations of policy that commend a
type of action of which he alone can be aware and can appreciate the significance.
But the alteration of decisions, other than a chipping off of certain portions of
them by a partial veto, I do not think is contemplated by Section 801." Mr. Wol-
verton, Chairman of the Committee, expressed his view in this manner: "I have no
hesitancy in saying that it was my understanding of the Act when it was origi-
nally drawn that such power was given to the President as having an over-all
knowledge of the foreign situation and that foreign affairs alone would dictate
the approval or disapproval."
26 See note 17 supra.
27 See note 19 supra.
28 See note 20 supra.
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to judicial review,29 and since the majority of the court admitted that they
were not reading the language of the statute literally,30 the question re-
mains as to why the possibility was rejected by the majority of the court.
Any inquiry is largely a matter of speculation in view of the fact that the
majority rather summarily concluded that the final order was an act of
executive discretion, without attempting to evaluate the argument of a
two part order.
In the first place, it has to be admitted that in its operation under the
Act, the CAB has denied the limited scope of the President's participation
and has considered itself bound by his recommendations, whether matters of
foreign affairs, or questions of qualifications under the terms of the stat-
ute.3 ' While such interpretation by the administrative agency has some
validity,8 2 it is certainly not binding upon the courts,33 at least in the
absence of a long continued and settled practice.3 4 Certainly there is no
settled practice involved here which alone would have influenced the court
to the position it assumed.3 5
It is also argued that since the President is required only to approve
or disapprove, without assigning reasons for his actions, it is impossible to
specify the grounds on which he shall base his actions, and more particu-
larly, to confine him to action within whatever grounds may be specified.
In a very practical sense the argument has validity, in that even if it can
be shown that the President has acted on considerations which the statute
29 "Congress made reviewable by the courts only orders 'issued by the Board
under this Act.' Those orders can be reviewed without reference to any conduct
of the President, for that part of the order which is the work of the Board is
plainly identifiable. The President is presumably concerned only with the impact
of the order on foreign relations or military matters. To the extent .that he disap-
proves action taken by the Board, his action controls. But where that is not done,
the Board's orders have an existence independent of Presidential approval, trac-
ing to Congress' power to regulate commerce." Douglas, J., dissenting in the
principal case, 333 U.S. 103, 116 (1948).
30 333 U.S. 103, 110 (1948). The court admits the literal meaning of the lan-
guage of Section 1006 (a) confers the right to judicial review. The court also con-
ceded that the language was deliberately employed.
31 See Additional Service to Latin America, 6 CAB 857 (1946), supra note 6.
The President disapproved the issuance of a certificate to Pan-American Airways
and directed that a certificate for the same route be issued to Western Airlines,
Inc. The language of the Board's opinion, in which the directions of the President
were incorporated, indicates that the Board considered itself bound by the Presi-
dent's action. For another recent manifestation of the same attitude on the part
of the Board, see Pacific Northwest-Hawaii Service Case, CAB Order E4832,
March 16, 1948. Considering applications by Northwest Airlines, Matson Naviga-
tion Co., Pan-American Airways and Transocean Air Lines, the Board decided
that one carrier, on a temporary basis,' was required by the public convenience
and necessity. The Board selected Northwest Airlines as that carrier. The Presi-
dent approved and the certificate was issued. On October 4, 1948 the Board issued
a supplemental opinion in the case, and recited .that pursuant to a directive of the
President, based on "the national security and the public welfare," that Pan-
American would be certificated to fly the same route. CAB Press Release No.
48-81, October 4, 1948.
32 Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 96 (1935). See Fishgold v. Sullivan
Drydock and Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 290 (1946), where the idea is expressed
that as these interpretations are often made in the absence of adversary proceed-
ings, they should be entitled to less weight.
a3 See Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944), where
the court overruled an interpretation by the Administrator of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.
34 Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245 (1926). For the effect of a long con-
tinued administrative practice, see Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938).
3 The Civil Aeronautics Act took effect in 1938. The issue herein involved
had been before the courts only twice (note 9 supra) before presentation to the
Supreme Court as a matter of first impression.
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has attempted to put beyond his reach, there are no sufficient means by which
he can be disciplined and forced to remain within the designated bounds.
This situation is fairly common in our system of rough checks and balances,
however.36 Frequently the limits to interabtion between the branches is
obscure. The proper operation of the system depends upon a restraint by
each branch of itself, as well as restraint by one branch on another. 7 Each
must give the other branches an opportunity to perform their functions
properly and if Congress here chooses to take the risk of participation by
an executive who will perhaps overstep certain designated limits, the choice
is properly made by Congress and not for Congress by the judiciary.
Undoubtedly the most substantial objection to the suggested division of
the final order stems from the same uncertainty as to the basis on which
the President might approve the Board's denial of an application. Since
his approval may result from a determination that an American air route
in that particular locale would prejudice the conduct of our foreign affairs,
as well as a mere consent to the Board's determinations, it is said that
judicial review of the Board's order in this case is unconstitutional because
it concerns an issue which is subject to subsequent executive action which
may prevent its effectiveness.38
The argument, however, .seems to read too much into the requirement
of judicial finality. That rule is satisfied if there is a real issue between
the parties which the court is in a position to settle conclusively, whether or
not completely distinct factors may enter the picture and prevent the set-
tlement from effectively imposing obligations or creating rights.8 9 The
problem here is whether such an issue is involved when a party to CAB pro-
ceedings appeals the Board's decision as to questions of fitness, willingness,
or ability, or its determination as to the public convenience and necessity,
when the final determinations which result from such appeal may be ren-
dered ineffective by the refusal of the President to approve. Decisions
of the Court of Claims provide a pertinent line of inquiry. Though these
decisions depend upon subsequent appropriations by Congress to make
them effective as a practical matter, they are subject to review despite the
inability of the court to force appropriation by Congress of the necessary
funds. 40  Similarly, courts continually review adjudications of criminal
guilt, though it is.within executive power to render these determinations
ineffective by means of a pardon. Here there is a real issue presented to
36 Congress cannot be forced to appropriate funds to satisfy Court of Claims
judgments. See Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1895), and United States
v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). Presumably the Supreme Court could decide an
issue on other than legal considerations and yet not be subject to effective disci-
pline. See note 41 infra, for an example of the failure of Congress to make a nec-
essary appropriation.
87 See Mr. Justice Burton dissenting in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304,
338 (1946).
38 United States v. Jefferson Electric Mfg. Co., 291 U.S. 386 (1934); Muskrat
v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697
(1894).
39 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270 (1941);
Federal Power Commission v. Pacific Power and Light Co., 307 U.S. 156 (1939);
Nashville, C. and St. L. Railway Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933),
40 United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477 (1886) ; United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303 (1946). Compare this with the decision of Gordon v. United States, 117
U.S. 697 (1895), where Court of Claims judgments were held non-reviewable un-
der the Court of Claims Act which required the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury of such judgments. Where the validity of the judgment itself is subject
to later executive action, there can be no judicial review. See Gordon v. United
States, supra. Where subsequent executive action will perhaps only prevent ac-
tual enforcement of the order, however, there is an issue which is subject to re-
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the court upon review. The parties are in conflict as to whether the denial
of an application was proper under the statute. The court is in a position
to settle that question conclusively, whether or not the President, acting
upon entirely distinct considerations of foreign policy, prevents the ordinary
consequences to follow from a Board order which has been amended after
judicial review.
Although the suggested interpretation of the Civil Aeronautics Act does
not afford a completely efficient administrative process, 41 and perhaps does
not give full effect to all the language of the statute, 42 it is suggested that
the difficulty arises from the nature of the problem which the statute is
designed to cover, and from the mechanical difficulties of language in at-
tempting to delineate between the concern of Congress for the regulation
of Commerce, and that of the Chief Executive for the conduct of our foreign
affairs.43 The interpretation suggested here, however, seems to provide
a workable statute, and yet to give effect to the objectives of the statute
with a minimum of violence to the language of Section 1006 (a).
J. F. G.
PARAMOUNT PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL NEW
ROUTE CASES
An air carrier' seeking to engage in foreign air transportation must first
obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Civil
Aeronautics Board issued under section 401 of the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938.2 The Board, in making a determination as to whether such certifi-
cates should issue, must consider the Congressional "Declaration of Policy,"
found in section 2 of the Act, wherein the Board is admonished to encourage
and develop an air transportation system adopted to the present and future
needs of the foreign as well as the domestic commerce of the United States,
view. See United States v. Lovett, supra, and Federal Power Commission v. Pacific
Power and Light Co., 307 U.S. 156 (1939).
There appears to be no objection to judicial review of orders of the CAB
where Presidential approval is not required. Yet these orders may be rendered
ineffective by failure of Congress to appropriate the necessary funds. Congress
so failed to appropriate the necessary funds in the American Export Airlines
Case, 2 CAB 16 (1940).
41 The requirement of judicial review of a denial of an application by the
Board, which has been approved by the President may be wasted effort, inasmuch
as the President may subsequently disapprove of an affirmative order of the Board
issued in compliance with the order of the reviewing court.
42 There is some inconsistency between the conclusion that the President has
a mere power of veto under Section 801, note 5 supra, and the language of that
section in requiring his approval or disapproval of negative orders of the Board.
The inconsistency is partially answered by considering this requirement as an
invitation to the President for his recommendations, which, if containing secret
information, are protected from public disclosure by Section 1104 of the Act. 52
Stat. 1026 (1938), 49 USCA §674 (Supp. 1946). Acceptance of this answer seems
to conform more closely to the language of Section 801, note 5 supra, than does
the conclusion of the Supreme Court conform to the language of Section 1006(a),
note 8 supra;
43 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), for a good
example of the interplay of these. two interests.
1 An "air carrier" is any citizen of the United States who undertakes to
engage in air transportation. 1(2)., 52 Stat. 987 (1938), 49 USCA §481 (Supp.
1946).
2 Foreign Air Carriers file under section 402(b) of the Act, which has no
"public convenience and necessity" clause, and the Board need only find that the
transportation covered by the application is "required by the public interest."
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of the Postal Service, and of national defense, and to authorize "Competition
to the extent necessary" to assure the development of such a system. 3 Be-
fore publication, certificates authorizing U.S. flag carriers to engage in
overseas and foreign air transportation must be submitted to the President
for approval.
4
In the first international air route cases the Board set up three general
criteria for determining whether the public convenience and necessity re-
quired the certification of the proposed service in the particular situation
presented. These criteria are: 5
(1) Whether the new service will serve a useful public purpose, re-
sponsive to a public need;
(2) Whether this purpose can and will be served adequately by exist-
ing facilities;
(3) Whether the cost to the Government will be outweighed by the
benefit which will accrue to the public from the new service.
During this period, before World War II, the Pan American Airways
system and its half-owned, Panagra, enjoyed a virtual monopoly of all
United States international air service."
The first competition on a major route for Pan American Airways sys-
tem from an American-flag carrier was authorized by the Board in July of
1940, when American Export Airlines7 was temporarily certified across the
North Atlantic to Lisbon.8 In this case the Board did not enumerate its
three point standard as such. Although public interest was found to require
additional service, the Board recognized that competition was the underly-
ing issue of the case. 9 The Board concluded that under Section 2 of the
Act competition is not mandatory, but that it is within the discretion of
3 52 Stat. 980 (1938), 49 USCA §402 (Supp. 1946).
4 Section 801 of the Act, 52 Stat. 1014 (1938), 49 USCA §601 (Supp. 1947).
Approval of the President is not needed in domestic cases. In international cases,
the Board is initial arbiter and the President's advisor. CAB v. Waterman
Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948). In domestic cases the Board is the sole
arbiter. United A. L. v. CAB, 155 F.(2d) 810 (C.A.A. 2d, 1944).
5 These factors were considered in Pan American Inc., Los Angeles-Mexico
City Operation, 2 CAB 807, 809 (1941). A Fourth test was added in those cases
involving service to Canada: (4) whether the applicant can serve the purpose
without impairing the operations of existing carriers contrary to the public in-
terest. Western Air Express, Great Falls-Lethbridge Operation, 2 CAB 425
(1940). These four tests were also used in the earlier domestic route cases.
United A. L., Red Bluff Operation, 1 CAA 778 (1940); Trans-Southern Air,
Amarillo-Oklahoma City Operation, 2 CAB 250 (1940), and previous cases cited
therein; see also, Comment, 14 J. Air L. & C. 177 (1947). The new route cases
are to be distinguished from the "grandfather" cases under Section 401(e) of
the Act.
6 LISSITZYN, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION 240 (1942).
7 Now: American Overseas Airlines.
8 American Exprot Air, Trans-Atlantic Service, 2 CAB 16 (1940).
9 The Board rejected Pan American's contentions that foreign-flag carriers
would supply the necessary competition. Also rejected was American Export's
contention that competition was mandatory under Section 2 of the Act. The Board
said quoting from its opinion in Acquisition of Western A. E. by United A. L.,
1 CAA 739 (1940) : "Reference to both the legislative history and to the text of
the Act demonstrates the Congressional intent to safeguard an industry of vital
importance to the commercial and defense interests of the nation against the ends
of unrestrained competition on the one hand, and the consequences of monopolistic
control on the other." This conclusion receives support in the remarks of Senator
McCarran made in the course of the debate on the floor of the Senate prior to
the enactment of the Act. Vol. 83, Congressional Record, 75th Congress, 3rd
Session pp. 9029-30, May 13, 1938. American Export Inc., 2 CAB 16, 31 (1940).
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the Board to determine whether or not competition in a particular area is
necessary to assure the attainment of the objectives of the Act. Competi-
tion was held to be justified at even greater cost to the government.' 0
Between December 1941 and June 1943, there was a suspension of most
international applications by the Board in the interest of the war effort."
Public interest required the issuance only of temporary certificates, with the
needs of the war effort and considerations of national defense of prime
importance.12
Since the end of the war, there has been a comprehensive expansion in
the authorization of new routes for American-flag carriers in the interna-
tional field. After extensive study, the Board announced on June 14, 1944,
"the international air routes which it had tentatively concluded would be
desirable for post war operation by United States air carriers."'1 3 This
determination of routes before a certification proceeding was a considerable
departure from the Board's usual procedure in both the international and
domestic fields. 14 Following the release of the public announcement of the
route pattern, the United States carriers were invited to submit applica-
tions for the various routes and consolidated proceedings were scheduled
in conformity with this program.15
The first of these intercontinental proceedings to be decided by the Board
was the North Atlantic Case.16 Because of the heavy traffic between the
United States and Europe, this case was of unusual significance. At the
outset, the Board held that there was no issue as to Whether as a matter of
policy 17 United States international air service should be rendered by a
chosen instrument.' 8 The Board not only reaffirmed its position that com-
petition was desirable's in the international field, but concluded that do-
mestic carriers should be authorized to engage in international operations. 20
10 Congress refused the appropriation necessary to permit operation of this
route. LISSITZYN, op. cit. supra note 7 at 257.
11 CAB Ann. Rep. 20-21 (1942).
12 New Route Cases; Pan. Am. Airways Co., United States-Africa Service,
:3 CAB 47 (1941). Terminal points were Miami, Florida, and Leopoldville, Bel-
gian Congo. Certificates in this case were limited to a five year period or to
terminate at the discretion of the Secretary of State. American Export, 3 CAB
:294 (1941). Terminal points New York, N. Y. and Foynes, Irish Free State. In
American Air., Temporary Mexico City Operation, 3 CAB 415 (1942), the Board
found that a route from El Paso, Texas and Mexico City, Mexico was not in the
public interest but the certificate was awarded in accordance with the recom-
mendation of the President.
13 For a. listing of the routes, see CAB Annual Report for 1944, 11-14.
14 The Board has been frequently criticized for authorizing new domestic
routes without ever having formulated a basic pattern of airline service for the
United States. See Patterson, Stewardship of the Airlines by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board, supra.
15 These cases are Northwest Air. et al., North Atlantic Routes, 6 CAB
319 (1945) ; Additional Service to Latin America, 6 CAB 857 (1945) ; Northwest
Airlines Inc., et al., Pacific Case, 7 CAB 209 (1946); American Overseas Air-
lines, Inc., et al., South Atlantic Case, 7 *CAB 285 (1946).
10 These considerations were adhered to in all of the post-war cases.
17 The Board said this issue was settled by Congress in the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938 and that any arguments or contentions directed to the validity of
such policy are properly addressed to the Congress and not to the Board. North
Atlantic Case, supra note 15 at 323.
18 For a discussion of the "chosen instrument" controversy see, Hearings
Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce H. R. 939, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. and 79th Congress, 1st Session on S. 326, pp. 10-11.
19 Competition in the international field was first stated to be in the public
interest in American Export, supra note 8.
20 In 1931 Postmaster General Brown advised the domestic air carriers to
stay out of the international field and the international carriers to stay out of
the domestic field. LISSITZYN op. cit., supra note 7.
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To facilitate flexibility in the adjustment of certificates to meet changing
political and economic conditions during the post-war period, the Board
determined that all certificates issued were to be limited to a period of seven
years from their effective date. 21 It was also decided that certificates would
be issued for routes into areas for which no landing rights had been ob-
tained. 22
The North Atlantic area was recognized as the most important world
area from a political, commercial, and competitive standpoint. To assure
the sound development of the United States air transportation within
Europe and the near East, this territory was divided into Northern, Cen-
tral, and Southern areas. 23 It was believed that this plan offered the great-
est opportunity for a sound growth and development of the traffic poten-
tialities and still the necessary degree of competition. 24 It was optimistically
predicted that the advantages of air transportation would effect a substantial
increase in U.S. traffic to the heavily populated and industrial interior areas
as market sources. Whereas the records show that 47% of United States
travel to Europe in the three years immediately preceeding the war was
recreational, it was anticipated that there would be a marked increase in
non-recreational travel which would tend to equalize the seasonal variations
and directional unbalance which has characterized historical transatlantic
surface travel.
25
'Estimates of probable express, freight, and other cargo volume were
given due consideration, although the Board recognized that passenger
traffic in general would constitute the principal source of commercial reve-
nue for the transatlantic air carriers during the first post-war decade. The
record did not show that the volume and nature of market potentials gener-
ated by the great majority of foreign traffic centers warranted direct service
on more than one United States flag route. The exceptions were the London
and Lisbon gateways. The more important of the European centers are
included within a relatively small geographical area connected by extensive
surface and air transport facilities. Further, transatlantic carriers of
foreign nationality were expected to share the traffic between these centers
and the United States. It was concluded that the public interest would be
best served by a single United States carrier being certified within each of
the three areas.
Mr. Branch dissented on the authorization of TWA's route segment
from Cairo to Bombay. As the majority opinion did not discuss the com-
21 The Board pointed out that it was impossible to predict the volume of
traffic to and from Europe, the precise operating rights through the countries
of Europe, including the duration and extent of such rights, as well as the whole
course of international relations which might affect the future of international
air transportation. This is equally true of the later cases.
22 It was believed that it was not only desirable, but perhaps necessary, that
the Department of State have a proposed air service pattern to assist in diplo-
matic negotiations for the necessary commercial landing rights.
23 The northern area included the Scandinavian countries, the United King-
dom, the northern section of Germany, Poland, and eastern Russia. The central
area was composed of central Europe and extended into Asia to India. The
southern area included Western Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa and
southern India.
24 The three area plan would limit direct duplicating United States services
to two major Atlantic gateways, London and Lisbon, leaving the carriers free to
fully develop the traffic potentials within their respective areas.
25 The Passport Division of the Department of State estimated that from
1935 to 1938, 47% of total overseas travel by United States citizens was for pur-
poses of recreation, 35% for family affairs and personal business, while commer-
cial and professional business together accounted for only 6.2% of such travel.
North Atlantic Case, supra note 15 at 330.
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mercial necessity of this southern route, or PAA's more northerly route
through.Turkey to Karachi and Calcutta, it seems probable, in view of the
low traffic potential of this segment, that it was certified on a basis of
consideration of foreign policy rather than commerce.
Somewhat different problems were presented in the Latin American
Case.2 6 After pointing up the community of interest and the statistical
data relative to the traffic potential in the area involved, the Board compared
the advantages of various United States cities around the Gulf and in the
Southeastern states as gateways to Latin American traffic. In considering
service by American carriers below the north coast of South America, 27
the majority recognized the need for competition but reached the conclusion
that the traffic potential was not such as would justify the maintenance of
duplicate schedules. 28 The majority stressed the part economic considera-
tions should play and concluded that an additional route was not justified.
Chairman Pogue, in his dissent, held that rigid application of economic
standards could be made only at the expense of other important considera-
tions of national welfare 29 and urged that an additional route be certified.
Mr. Lee recommended certification of two new routes within South America,
expressing the belief that the Board should at once provide a competitive
system of trunk lines to all important areas in South America, evaluating
the traffic potentials from a long range point of view. The President's so-
lution included a second carrier.30
The route pattern of the Pacific Case3' was conditioned by the long dis-
tances between traffic terminals. Two natural routes existed, the northern
Great Circle route and the long central over water 'route through Hawaii,
Midway, and Guam. The majority decided one carrier should be certified
over each of these routes to the. Orient, and that the routes of Pan American
and TWA into India should be extended eastward to connect with them32
giving the United States two round-the-world services. Mr. Branch's dis-
sent expressed the fear that an extension of TWA's routes, in view of
meager traffic potentials, would put too heavy a drain upon that carrier's
financial resources; and that it might even weaken TWA's credit standing,
thus affecting its development in both the international and domestic
fields. 33 Mr. Lee argued that the risk of extravagant and unjustified inter-
national air services is not so great as the danger of a failure to meet the
public demand for adequate air transportation, thereby leaving a gap in the
26 Additional Service to Latin America, supra note 15.
27 For convenience the Board divided this case into three areas for considera-
tion: (1) Mexico, Cuba, and the Bahamas; (2) Caribbean region, Central Amer-
ica, and the north coast of South America; (3) the remainder of South America.
Id. 6 CAB at 869.
28 It was believed that extension of Panagra's routes into the United States
would provide sufficient competition over divergent routes. Id. 6 CAB at 914.29 Some of these intangible factors specifically mentioned were the need for
fast, efficient and cheap transportation, and the need, as indicated by the war, for
a system linking all points required by the national interest. Revised opinion of
the Board, March 4, 1946, made public by letter to the Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Appropriations, May 6, 1948.
30 The President recommended that an additional route be certified in this
area. It is probable that this recommendation was motivated by considerations of
national defense.31 Pacific Case, supra note 15.
32 These routes had been certified in the North Atlantic Case, supra note 15.
TWA's routes were extended to connect with the Pacific route certified to North-
west Airlines, while P.A.A. was given the final links for a single round the world
system. Pacific Case, supra note 15. As of November, 1948, TWA was not oper-
ating the routes certified to it in the Pacific Case.33 See Mr. Branch's dissenting opinion in the North Atlantic Case, supra note
15, wherein he opposed the extension of TWA's routes from Cairo to Bombay.
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foundation of the air pattern of American-flag carriers which would be
filled by foreign competitors. In addition, a failure to authorize another
carrier to operate a second northern route into the Orient and an additional
route from Hawaii to Japan would put Pan American in such an over-
powering position in the Orient that it would be difficult for any other
American carrier to offer really effective competition; thereby nullifying
the whole effort of the Board to create a wholesome competitive balance in
the Pacific area.
In the South Atlantic Case3 4 it was recognized that the cost of the service
would be relatively high in comparison to the commercial value of the pro-
posed routes.3 5 It was found that the traffic potential would not permit
competition in this area. , The proceeding involved two more or less inde-
pendent services. Commercial and traffic potentials were found sufficient to
justify a direct United States to Africa service. The second route from
South America across the South Atlantic to Africa was authorized solely on
considerations of national defense.
The Board has not in these post-war cases, followed its earlier three




without enumerating them as such.
In considering the commercial criterion, the Board has had to weigh
the need for a given service with its cost to the government. In all of
the cases the Board considered the historical statistics and information on
traffic to and *from the United States and the area under consideration. 6
The historical record, while affording valuable background for estimating fu-
ture requirements, was recognized as having its serious limitations. It was
optimistically predicted that post-war air transportation would see marked
increases in the traffic between all world areas. The determination of
international air rdutes was not measured solely in economic terms of
passengers carried and revenue ton-miles flown, but also in terms of broad
national welfare and many intangible factors that affect it. Although na-
tional defense was only explicitly recognized as a predominant factor in
the South Atlantic Case, it seems most probable that it was given great
weight in the certification of TWA's route across Northern Africa in the
North Atlantic Case.
The Board has adhered to the position that a sound development of our
international air service requires competition. 37 The policy of regulated
34 South Atlantic Case, supra note 15.
35 The Board said that in view of our pre-war commerce with Africa, and the
probability that the United States would be able to take over a substantial por-
tion of the former Axis nations trade in the area the northern route would be in
the public interest. The prospects of any traffic over the southern route from
South America to Africa were believed to be too meager to warrant authorization
of the route from an economic standpoint.
36 The records contained statistics on passport issuances, the flow of mail and
parcel post to and from areas, hotel reservations, and freight and passenger traffic
data of surface carriers and other like information.
37 Pan American had opposed the applications of all other carriers upon the
grounds that: (1) the airline which had pioneered a route or territory should be
permitted to continue to develop that route or territory to the point of full utiliza-
tion of its facilities; (2) the public is interested in the economies which are pos-
sible through the use of large high-speed aircraft which could not be efficiently
operated if the traffic must be shared with two or more American-flag operators;(3) increasing foreign-flag competition would supply all the competition required
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competition as contemplated by the Act3 8 has been held in all the post-war
cases, except the South Atlantic Case, to require competitive service over
comparable or alternative routes within the major geographical areas, but
not necessarily duplicating services.3 9 It is believed that the greatest benefit
from competition, whether it be actual or potential, is the stimulus to devise
and experiment with new operating techniques and new equipment, 'to
develop new means of acquiring and promoting business, including the
rendering of better service to the public and to the country, and to "afford
the Government comparative yardsticks" by which the performance of the
United States operators can be measured. The diversion of passengers and
revenue which a competing service will cause between the various carriers
as a factor in the international cases has not been accorded the same im-
portance as it has in the domestic cases.
40
When competition has been decided upon, the selection of carriers be-
comes a major problem. The Board has stressed as essential that the se-
lected carrier be strong in organization, experience, financial position, and
executive ability if the public interest is to be best served. In the North
Atlantic Case the Board was faced with a choice of Pan American and
American Export, five domestic carriers and three corporations which had
not as yet engaged in air transportation. Pan American was selected be-
cause of its long history and noteworthy achievements in the international
field. The Board reviewed the wartime experience of American Export,
and also its proposed merger with American, the largest of the domestic
transcontinental carriers. The Board approved the acquisition of American
Export by American and certified the northern route to it, stating that this
would permit the utilization of the combined strength of the two companies,
making use of the operating organization and experience and traffic generat-
ing facilities of American in this country and the experience gained by
Export in its international service.
TWA was selected from the remaining applicants on the basis of its
superior financial strength, organization and experience. In rejecting the
by the public interest; and (4) regulated monopoly would better serve the public
interest. These contentions were advanced and rejected in the North Atlantic
Case, supra note 15, and in Additional Service to Latin America, supra note 15 at
861.
38 The Board has taken the position that Congress has left to the discretion
of the Board the determination of whether or not competition in a particular area
is necessary to assure the sound development of an appropriate air transportation
system.
It was pointed out in the American Export Case that the economic regulatory
power conferred by Title IV of the Act is less comprehensive in respect to air car-
riers engaged in foreign transportation than to those engaged in domestic service.
Whereas the Board may enforce the duty imposed on the air carriers by sec. 404
(a) to provide adequate service, equipment, and facilities in interstate or overseas
air transportation, its power in this respect does not extend to operations of air
carriers engaged in foreign air transportation, upon whom the Act imposes no
similar duty. Moreover, the Board's power to regulate rates, fares, and charges
of air carriers does not extend to operations in foreign air transportation. Thus
regulation alone may not be relied on to take the place of the stimulus which com-
petition provides to the advancement of techniques and service in air transporta-
tion. Competition invites comparisons as to equipment, costs, personnel, methods
of operations, solicitation of traffic, and the like, all of which tend to assure the
development of an air transportation system properly adopted to the present and
future needs of foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal
Service, and of national defense. American Export Case, supra note 8.
31) Point to point competition was presumed to be furnished by foreign-flag
carriers.
40 This factor was given the most weight in Additional Service to Latin
America, supra note 16. For its importance in domestic new route cases see Com-
ment 14 J. Air L. & C. 177 (1947).
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two newly formed companies the Board pointed out that their lack of facili-
ties would not permit the earliest operation of the routes. The one steam-
ship company was rejected on a basis of lack of experience. In the Ha-
waiian Case, however, Matson was rejected because it was too strongly
entrenched in the tourist business and would not have an undivided loyalty
to the development of the air transportation.41 Among the other factors
considered, the Board attempted to select the carrier which can best inte-
grate the new international route with its existing routes, both international
and domestic, and which can make the fullest utilization of existing facili-
ties.42
It must be borne in mind that all the certificates granted in the post-war
intercontinental cases are for a seven year period. As these certificates ex-
pire, the Board will be able to resurvey its entire route pattern, and with the
experience and data gained in these years substituted for the estimates
which formed a basis for these decisions, a sounder, more integrated pattern
of international air service should evolve.
FRANCIS T. CROWE*
41 Hawaiian Case, 7 CAB 83 (1946). This was an overseas air transporta-
tion case. involving only United States territory, but the problems presented were
in many respects similar. In rejecting the applications of two steamship com-
panies in the South Atlantic Case the Board recognized that they presented fairly
adequate organizational plans, but that their fulfillment would necessarily re-
quire greater time and be susceptible to longer periods of adjustment than would
be those of an existing carrier.
42 This factor was of particular importance in the Pacific Case, supra note 15,
at 22.
* Student, Northwestern Law School, Competitor Legal Publication Board.
